Abstract
Introduction
Zero-knowledge proofs are defined as the proofs which convey no additional knowledge other than the correctness of the proposition in question.
An interactive proof [1, 2] of a proposition is an interactive protocol between two entities, a prover and a verifier. After performing the protocol, the verifier is convinced of the correctness of the proposition. Interactive proofs have one remarkable advantage compared to conventional proofs, which is that, there exist protocols for proving a proposition such that the verifier does not receive any information apart from the correctness of the proposition. So the verifier is not able to prove the proposition to other people. Furthermore, the information which the verifier obtains seems completely random to him and the verifier is always convinced of the correctness of the proposition after performing the protocol if he is honest. This property is called honest-verifier zero-knowledge.
The original definition of zero-knowledge was provided in [3] and their applicability to any language L in NP was demonstrated in [4] . [5] Showed that all statements in NP have a zero-knowledge proof-system, where the prover is computationally unbounded, while the verifier is a probabilistic polynomial-time machine. Then [6] [7] [8] modified the original model the existing method cannot provide a feasible way to achieve it. [27, 36] considered one similar case, but [27, 36] also cannot provide a feasible (efficient and practical) zeroknowledge proof of equality of double discrete logarithms, because their idea is based on traditional inefficient method, i.e., the cut-and-choose method, so [27] also thinks that it is an open problem.
Using the techniques of [42] , the honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof can be turned into a signature scheme by replacing the verifier by a hash function, i.e., the challenge is set to the hash value of the commitment (and of the message to be signed). So as the existing scheme [10, 13, 19, 27, [30] [31] [32] 35 , 39] did, we also provide the noninteractive version of our three protocols of zero-knowledge proofs, i.e., the signature based on proofs of knowledge (SPK).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The section 2 gives preliminaries of our design, and in particular, the existing knowledge proof of double discrete logarithm is presented. In the section 3, we provide the new zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of double discrete logarithms and the SPK of the proofs, and we also provide the security proofs of these designs. In the section 4, we analyze system efficiency. Finally, the paper concludes in the section 5.
Preliminaries

Cryptographic Assumptions
Problem 1 (Strong RSA Problem). For given (n, z), finding uG and eZ 1 satisfying z ≡ u e (mod n), where n=pq is an RSA-like modulus and G is a cyclic subgroup of Z * n of order #G, log 2 (#G)=l G .
Assumption 1 (S-RSA Assumption) [43, 44] . A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm K exists which on input 1 l G outputs (n, z) such that for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm P, the probability that P can solve the S-RSA Problem is negligible. 1 
The Representation Problem [45]
Definition 1. k ≥ 2 is polynomial in the length of input, q is a prime. A generator-tuple of length k is (g 1 ,…, g k ), where for i, j {1,…, k}, g i , g i  G q \{1}, if i ≠ j, and g i ≠ g j . An indextuple of length k is (a
Number-Theoretic Foundations
Considering the system security, it is necessary to choose a safe RSA modulus n, i.e., n=pq, with pq, p=2p+1, q=2q+1, and p, q, p, q are all odd prime. So we can restrict operation to the subgroup of quadratic residues modulo n, i.e., the cyclic subgroup QR(n) generated by an element of order pq which has no small factors. Note that the Corollary 2 not only shows how to achieve the security feature described above, but also provides a method to verify the order of an element without knowing it, which is used in the setup of our system. 
The Schnorr Identification Protocol [46]
In the Figure 1 , t is the commitment, c is the challenge information, and s is the response. y (=g x ) is published public key of the prover and x is secret key. After performing the protocol, the prover can convince the verifier of his identity by proving his knowledge of the discrete logarithm of y. Note that ∈R denotes choosing at random. These signatures of knowledge given below can be proved secure in the random oracle model [47] , and their interactive versions are statistical (honest-verifier) zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge [11] . The building blocks have in common that the signer does not know the order of G=g, however its bit-length l G (i.e., the integer l G s.t.
is publicly known. Fujisaki and Okamota show that [42] the standard proofs of knowledge protocols that work for a group of known order are also proofs of knowledge in this setting under the S-RSA. We give three basic building blocks: signature of knowledge of (1) a discrete logarithm (Definition 4); (2) equality of two discrete logarithms (Definition 5); (3) a double discrete logarithm (Definition 6). The blocks (1) and (2) will be used in our scheme, and the block (3) will be significantly improved in this paper. ε is the system security parameter, and ε>1. Finally, let H: {0,1} * → {0,1} k denote a strong collision-resistant hash function which maps a binary string of arbitrary length to a k-bit hash value. 
 The Existing SPK of Double Discrete Logarithm
We provide SPK form (cf. [10] ) for comparing efficiency later, since the existing knowledge-proof schemes [10, 13, 19, 27, 30-32, 35, 39] usually provide SPK form and describe knowledge proofs in this customary way. As noted earlier, there always exists a corresponding protocol of a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, i.e., the interactive version of SPK. In fact, all the existing SPK schemes of double discrete logarithm have the same mode. 
x). And it is denoted as SPK LOG 2 (α: y=g ( u α ) ) (m).
The SPK LOG 2 (α: y=g u α ) (m) can be computed as follows if the secret double discrete logarithm x of y to the bases g and u is known, i.e., x in y=g
Then, c=H(g║u║y║t̃1║t̃2║…║t̃k║m), and finally,
It is easy to see that in both computing the proofs and verifying the proofs, the computation complexities of the existing zero-knowledge proof of double discrete logarithm are all O(k). Moreover, the storage complexity and the communication complexity are also O(k). Since in applications, k>80, the existing schemes are inefficient.
Note that the knowledge of u x cannot be leaked too when proving the knowledge of x in y=g u x , so there is no simple method to achieve zero-knowledge proof of double discrete logarithm. In fact, so far, the efficiency problem of zero-knowledge proof of double discrete logarithm has not been solved.
New Zero-knowledge Proof of Knowledge of Double Discrete Logarithm
Basic Construction Definition 7.
A triple (c,s,s){0, ) (m). In our new SPK system, the security parameter of system ε > 1, y=g x (mod n) with x{0,1} l G , and
and computing c, s, s as:
It seems that there is one more modular exponentiation in SPK LOGnew comparing with conventional signatures of knowledge, but it will be proved essential to our system. That is to say, SPK LOGnew plays an important role in the proofs of knowledge of double discrete logarithm. In fact, we will see that it significantly improves the efficiency of proofs of knowledge of double discrete logarithm. The security proofs of SPK LOGnew are provided as follows. LOGnew , it follows that the signer has knowledge of x satisfying y=g x (mod n). Proof. We take two steps to prove that the signer has the knowledge of x satisfying y=g x (mod n).
Theorem 2. Under the Discrete Logarithm assumption, If the signer uses the knowledge of x to complete SPK
Step 
So when the knowledge extractor works, Δ = y c g c 2 
and gcd(n, y)=1 that can be verified in advance  (yg c+s ) c-ĉ= g ŝ-s (mod n).
Let d  gcd(c-ĉ, ŝ-s). t 1 and t 2 can be obtained by using the extended Euclidean algorithm, which are satisfying 
So the knowledge extractor can compute α without the knowledge of ord n (g):
So the signer has the knowledge of α satisfying yg c+s = g α (mod n).
Step 2: Analyze whether s is generated before c or not. Suppose s is generated before c. Then Δ = yg c+s (mod n) which is in H(y║g║Δ║Δ║m) for H( ) is a strong collision-resistant function and solving the representation problem (see in the Definition 1) is considered infeasible. Δ = yg c+s = (yg s )g c , as y is fixed and s is supposed generated before c, Δ is determined by g c . c is determined before g c for the Discrete Logarithm assumption, so c is determined before Δ which is a part of input of H( ). It contradicts that H( ) is a one-way function, so s is not generated before c. For the same reason, s and c are not generated at the same time.
So s is generated after c, and according to the result of Step 1, yg c+s = g α (mod n)  s = log g (g α /y)-c. As a result, log g (g α /y) has to be computed. If the signer has no knowledge of x satisfying y=g x (mod n), it contradicts the Discrete Logarithm assumption.
So it can conclude that the signer has the knowledge of x satisfying y=g x (mod n).  Theorem 3. Under the Discrete Logarithm assumption, the probability for the signer without discrete logarithm knowledge of y to generate a valid signature is less than 2 -k . Proof. Obviously if the signer S follows the protocol then the verifier V always accepts the signature. Let S̃ denotes a fraudulent S. S̃ can deviate from the protocol. We next consider the possibilities of cheating for S, i.e., S̃ does not know x and can generate a signature which can be verified by anyone. Note that in our signature scheme, m may contain any random element which is provided by V, that is to say, the randomness of c can be provided by S and V jointly.
Under the Discrete Logarithm assumption, x can not be achieved from y, so S̃ can not finish the signature following the normal way. It concludes that SPK LOGnew 
, and then guess the correct c by Algorithm guess : 
║m) is the crooked proof. S̃ has no advantage in guessing c in the scheme. First, as mentioned above, the randomness of c is provided by S and V jointly. Moreover, H( ) is a strong collisionresistant and one-way hash function, and c can not be generated before choosing c g . As a result, S̃ has to uniformly choose c g  {0, 1} k and then test it. So the probability of success for this attack Prob success < 2 -k , and therefore this attack becomes infeasible for sufficiently large k, e.g. k =160. 
, where μ<2 -k , i.e., the upper limit of the probability of success for this attack is 2 -k . We explain why there is the possibility of going to step (1) in step (6) in Algorithm guess .
The correct triple (c,s,s) is:
from ○ 2 and ○ 3 . Note that the ranges are related to the probability distribution of important system parameters. But c = H(y║g║g t (mod n)║g t (mod n)║m), i.e., c is a function f(y, t, t, m), and f(y, t, t, m) is a one-way function, so c in ○ 2 and ○ 3 can not be chosen arbitrarily, thus (s, s) can not traverse {-(2
, even x and m are not particular ones. As a result, the random selection of (s r , s r )
may lead Algorithm guess to choose it again, though t, t can vary in their ranges arbitrarily.
C (S, S, resp.) denotes guessing c (choosing s, s, resp.) correctly. For C, S and S are independent events for the ones without any knowledge of y, Prob( Proof. To prove that the scheme is statistical honest-verifier zero-knowledge for ε >1, we have to show that an honest verifier, i.e., the one who gives the challenge c  {0,1} k uniformly, can simulate a protocol-conversation that is statistically indistinguishable from a protocol-conversation with the signer. The following constitutes a simulator the verifier could use to do so.
The simulator randomly chooses s ̅ from {-(2
)+k] -1} and c ̅ from {0,1} k according to the uniform distribution. Using these values, the simulator computes Δ̅ = yg c̅ +s̅ (mod n), and Δ̅  = y c̅ g c̅ 2 +c̅ s̅ +s̅  . To prove that these values are statistical indistinguishable from a view of a protocol run with the signer, it suffices to consider the probability distribution P S (s) of the response s and P S (s) of the response s of the signer and the probability distribution P S̅ (s ̅ ) and P S̅  (s ̅ ) according to which the simulator choose s ̅ and s ̅ . s ̅ is the uniform distribution
, and s ̅  is the uniform distribution over {-(2 
We give a brief explanation of the above results. For example,
ε(l G +2) -1) Because t and x are mutually independent random variables, and c is the output of random oracle model, and t is the uniform distribution over {0,…,2
So this holds for any distribution of c over {0,1} k . The figure 2 illustrates the distribution of P S̅ (s ̅ ) and P S (s), and the distribution of P S̅  (s ̅ ) and P S (s) which we omit is similar to it, thus we have :
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For ε>1 and l G > k=160, the denominators of last terms of the above computing can be expressed as one over a polynomial in the input length, therefore the distributions of s and s ̅ are statistical indistinguishable, also the distributions of s and s ̅  are statistical indistinguishable.
So the interactive protocol corresponding to SPK new (α: y=g α ) (m) is an honest-verifier statistical zero-knowledge proof according to Definition 3. (We can see that ε controls the tightness of the statistical zero-knowledge.)  The idea of our proofs for Theorem 4 is inspired by [11] , and the method of which derives from [46] .
New Zero-knowledge Proof of Knowledge of Double Discrete Logarithm
TTP's Setup:  Select random secret l p -bits primes p, q such that p = 2p+1, q = 2q+1, p = 2p+1 and q = 2q+1 are all primes. Provide a proof that n = pq is the product of two safe primes [12] .  Choose random QR(n) g with order pq and a prime u with order pq (which can be verified without knowing it, see Corollary 2).  Compute y T =h x T with secret key x T ∈R {0,1} l G . The system public parameters are (g, h, n, pq), and the secret parameters (p, q) are not kept. Note that the TTP is not indispensable for all our schemes. We provide three schemes of knowledge proof of double discrete logarithm. x i (mod n). Proof. According to the SPK A in the step (3) of Protocol LOG 2 _1, we have A = g α 2 = g Δ 1 (mod n) with some known Δ 1 .
In the step (6) of Protocol LOG 2 _1, A=y u c+s (mod n).
From A=y u c+s (mod n) in the step (6) of Protocol LOG 2 _1, we have
. That is to say,
There are three cases.  If the prover has no knowledge of x in Δ 2 = u x (mod pq) (or Δ 2 has no form of u x (mod pq)), Case 1: If Δ 3 ≠ Δ 2 , s can not be computed under the discrete logarithm assumption. Case 2: If Δ 3 = Δ 2 , under the S-RSA assumption, the prover has to use the knowledge of double discrete logarithm in Δ 2 to compute the SPK A in the step (3), i.e., the knowledge (x 1 ,
x i (mod n), since the system parameters (p, q) are unknown to system users;  If the prover has the knowledge of x in Δ 2 = u x (mod pq), Case 3: According to (#), Δ 3 • u r = Δ 2 •u c+s = u x+c+s (mod pq). If Δ 3 has no form of u r 3 (mod pq) when the prover computes it, s can not be computed under the discrete logarithm assumption. Consequently, Δ 3 =u
is to say, s = r′-x-c. And because s=r′-x-c in Protocol LOG 2 is in the same form as above SPK LOGnew , the proof of statistical zero-knowledge property can be provided in the same way as the proof of Theorem 4, we omit it here.   With an off-line TTP, to achieve the proof of knowledge of double discrete logarithm, i.e., the proof of x in y=g u x (mod n), the prover does as follows.
Before performing Protocol LOG 2 _2 (or Protocol LOG 2 _3), the prover has an A Θ =g u r Θ (mod n) with r Θ {0,1} ε(l G +2) which had been generated by himself and the construction of which had been verified by the TTP using the previous common method. Then the TTP signed A Θ , e.g., using SPK A Θ =SPK(α: A T =A Θ α ∧y T =h α ) to sign A Θ . Note that if unlinkablity and anonymity are desirable, other signature technique (e.g., [9] ) can be used.  Note that the above process is performed only once, and then the prover can efficiently provide the proof of knowledge of double discrete logarithm any number of times. Protocol LOG 2 _2 : (1) The prover chooses r 1 ∈R{0,1} 
Theorem 6. Under the Discrete Logarithm assumption and the S-RSA assumption, the interactive protocol Protocol LOG 2 _2 is an honest-verifier statistical zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the double discrete logarithm of y=g u x (mod n). Proof.
According to the SPK U 1 and SPK A Θ in the protocol Protocol LOG 2 
, where the r Θ and r 1 are all known to the prover, i.e., r is known to the prover.
That is to say, we have A = g α (mod n) with some known α. From the step (6), A=y u c+s (mod n). So A = g u r = y u c+s (mod n) ………………… (#1).
In the step (6) of Protocol LOG 2 _2, A=y u c+s (mod n). So to the prover, y = A
That is to say, u r = Δ•u c+s (mod pq). Note that the r and Δ are known to the prover before computing s. So if Δ has no form of u x (mod pq), the prover has to compute the discrete logarithm to the base u when computing the response s.
We have r=x+c+s, since (p, q) are secret system parameters. That is to say, x=r-c-s. So the Protocol LOG 2 _2 is a protocol of the knowledge proof of x in y=g u x (mod n). And because s = r-x-c is the only one which is not a standard zero-knowledge proof form, we can provide the proof of statistical zero-knowledge property in the same way as the proof of the Theorem 4, we omit it here.   We extend our method to prove the equality of two double discrete logarithms, e.g., to prove that x 1 = x 2 in y 1 =g u x 1 (mod n) and y 2 =h u x 2 (mod n) in a zero-knowledge way. It can be done as follows. Protocol LOG 2 _3 :
Step (1) and (2) 
Efficiency Analysis
Our SPK LOG 2 new improves the time complexity and the space complexity from O(k) of the existing schemes [10, 13, 19, 27, 30-32, 35, 39] to O (1) .
Following the scheme [10] , we take ε =4/3 and λ=170 when counting the storage space. In the system, we take the public modulus n (= pq) to be 1024 bits and c (the output of hush function) to be 160 bits. Note that the cost of our storage space can be significantly reduced if using other groups (e.g., elliptic curve groups).
For achieving a clear comparison of computation costs, we consider the exponentiation costs which are the main computation costs. In a good implementation [18, 48] , the computation of the multi-based exponentiation does not take far more time than a single exponentiation. Normally, a multi-based exponentiation takes only 10% more time compared with a single-based exponentiation (assume that one multi-EXP operation multiplies up to 3 exponentiations). So for comparing clearly, we treat single exponentiation as multi-based exponentiation uniformly.
The existing signature schemes (SPK) based on proofs of knowledge of the double discrete logarithm [10, 13, 19, 27, 30-32, 35, 39] take 4k modular exponentiations to generate the signature and verify it, and in their systems, the probability of forging the signature Prob forging =2 -k . And our scheme takes O(1) modular exponentiations, while in our system, the probability of forging the signature Prob forging <2 -k . As mentioned before, usually, k>80 in applications, so for achieving the same security level, our scheme significantly improves the efficiency.
According to the table 1, with an off-line TTP, our SPK LOG 2 new_3 has provided an efficient solution to the open problem of proving the equality of two double discrete logarithms, e.g., proving that x 1 = x 2 in y 1 =g u x 1 (mod n) and y 2 =h u x 2 (mod n) in a zeroknowledge way.
Conclusion
We provide the first zero-knowledge proof of double discrete logarithm with constant complexity, and we also provide the first zero-knowledge proof of equality of double discrete logarithms. We redesign the basic construction of knowledge proof, so o ur knowledge proofs of double discrete logarithm are much more efficient than the existing schemes. The time complexity and the space complexity all change in quality. The zero-knowledge proof of equality of double discrete logarithms (i.e., our SPK LOG 2 new_3 ) is efficiently realized for the first time. Though being different from SPK LOG 2 new_1 , there is an off-line TTP, the prover can perform zero-knowledge proofs with any verifier any number of times after getting TTP's signature on his parameter just once. So for solving the open problem of zero-knowledge proving equality of double discrete logarithms, our idea is feasible in applications. Our contributions will make the systems [10, 13, 19, 27, 30-32, 35, 39] which use zero-knowledge proofs of double discrete logarithm more efficient and practical. the time complexity II (1) : the total computation of multi-based exponentiations II (2) : the multi-based exponentiations from each participant III :
the space complexity IV :
the storage space of the signature V : the probability of forging the signature VI :
the requirement of security parameter VII : the function of each scheme * :
the storage costs in RSA-groups
